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Abstract
Ensuring secure information  ow within programs in the context of multiple sensi
tivity levels has been widely studied Especially noteworthy is Dennings work in
secure  ow analysis and the lattice model  Until now however the soundness
of Dennings analysis has not been established satisfactorily We formulate Dennings
approach as a type system and present a notion of soundness for the system that can
be viewed as a form of noninterference Soundness is established by proving with
respect to a standard programming language semantics that all welltyped programs
have this noninterference property
Keywords  type systems program security soundness proofs
  Introduction
The problem of ensuring secure information ow within systems having multiple
sensitivity levels has been studied extensively beginning with the early work of Bell
and LaPadula  This was extended by the latticemodel work of Denning 	

who pioneered program certication an ecient form of static analysis that could
be easily incorporated into a compiler to verify secure information ow in programs
Dennings analysis has been characterized as an extension of an axiomatic logic for
program correctness by Andrews and Reitman   Other more recent eorts have
been aimed at extending the analysis to properly handle language features like
 D  Volpano G  Smith C  Irvine
procedures  	 
 and nondeterminism  while others have focused on integrity
analysis only   
So far there has not been a satisfactory treatment of the soundness of Den
nings analysis After all we want to be assured that if the analysis succeeds for a
given program on some inputs then the program in some sense executes securely
Denning provides intuitive arguments only in  Although a more rigorous ac
count of information ow in terms of classical information theory is given in  no
formal soundness proof is attempted Andrews and Reitman   do not address the
soundness of their ow logic at all Soundness is considered in rbk   but the
treatment depends on an instrumented semantics where every value is tagged
with a security class These classes are updated for values at run time according
to Dennings certication conditions A similar approach is taken by Mizuno and
Schmidt   However these approaches are unsatisfactory By modifying the se
mantics in this way there is no longer any basis for justifying the soundness of the
analysis Proving soundness in this framework essentially amounts to proving that
the analysis is consistent with the instrumented semantics But then it is fair to
ask whether class tags are updated correctly in the instrumented semantics There
is no justication for tag manipulation in the semantics
We take a typebased approach to the analysis The certication conditions of
Dennings analysis  are formulated as a simple type system for a deterministic
language A type system is basically a formal system of type inference rules for
making judgments about programs They are usually used to establish the type
correctness of programs in a stronglytyped language for example Standard ML
 However they are not limited to reasoning about traditional forms of type
correctness They can be regarded in general as logical systems in which to reason
about a wide variety of program properties In our case the property of interest is
secure information ow
Characterizing the analysis as a type system has many advantages It serves
as a formal specication that cleanly separates the security policies from the al
gorithms for enforcing them in programs The separation also admits a notion
of soundness for the analysis that resembles traditional noninterference  Intu
itively soundness states that variables in a welltyped program do not interfere
with variables at lower security levels This is formalized as a type soundness
theorem and proved It is interesting to point out that the soundness proof jus
ties a more exible treatment of local variablesin some cases there is an im
plicit ow to a local variable but the ow is actually harmless so it need not
be rejected The secure ow typing rules merge some traditional type correctness
concerns with secureow enforcement Upward information ows are easily ac
commodated through subtyping And nally though not addressed in this paper
the type system can be automated using standard type inference techniques to
analyze programs for secure ows
We begin with an overview of Dennings lattice model followed by an informal
treatment of the type system Examples are given to show how the typing rules
are used Then we turn our attention to a formal treatment of the type system and
prove a soundness theorem with respect to a standard semantics for the language
Other soundness eorts will then be discussed along with language extensions and
some directions for future research
A Sound Type System for Secure Flow Analysis 
 The Lattice Model of Information Flow
The lattice model is an extension of the Bell and LaPadula model  In this model
an information ow policy is dened by a lattice SC   where SC is a nite set
of security classes partially ordered by   SC may include secrecy classes like low
L and high H  as well as integrity classes like trusted T  and untrusted U 
where L   H and T   U  There may be combinations of them as well like HT
Every program variable x has a security class denoted by x It is assumed that
x can be determined statically and that it does not vary at run time If x and y
are variables and there is a ow of information from x to y then it is a permissible
ow i x   y
Every programming construct has a certication condition It is a purely syn
tactic condition relating security classes Some of these conditions control explicit
ows while others control implicit ows For example the statement y  x has
the condition x   y that is the ow of information from the security class of x
to that of y must be permitted by the ow policy This is an example of a con
dition controlling an explicit ow The conditions for other constructs such as if
statements and while loops control implicit ows For example there is always
an implicit ow from the guard of a conditional to its branches For instance in
the statement
if x  y then z  w else i  i   
there is an implicit ow from x and y to z and i So the statement has the
certication condition x y   z  i where  and  denote least upper bound and
greatest lower bound operators respectively The lattice property makes it possible
to enforce these conditions using a simple attribute grammar with synthesized
attributes only
 An Informal Treatment of the Type System
A type system consists of a set of inference rules and axioms for deriving typing
judgments A typing judgment for our purposes has the form
  p  
This judgment asserts that program or program phrase p has type  with respect
to identier typing  An identier typing is a map from identiers to types it
gives the types of any free identiers of p A judgment follows from the type system
if it is the last in a sequence of judgments where each judgment in the sequence is
an axiom or one that follows from preceding judgments by a type inference rule
For example consider a simple type system for integervalued expressions It
might contain the following three rules an axiom   i  int  which asserts that
every integer literal i has type int an inference rule
  x   if x  
giving us the type of any free identier x and the inference rule




  e  e
 
 int
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for deducing the types of expressions of the form e  e
 
 In inference rules the
judgments above the horizontal line are hypotheses and the judgment below the
line is the conclusion So if z  int  then
  z     int
is a judgment that follows from the type system We say z    is well typed with
respect to  in this case and that it has type int But if z  bool then the
judgment no longer follows from the system and we say z  is not well typed with
respect to 
The preceding example illustrates a traditional type system Our secure ow
type system is also composed of types and type inference rules but now the rules
enforce secure ow as opposed to data type compatibility The rules allow secure
ow judgments to be made for expressions and commands in a blockstructured
deterministic language
  Secure Flow Types
The types of our system are stratied into two levels At one level are the data
types denoted by   which are the security classes of SC  We assume that SC
is partially ordered by   At the other level are the phrase types denoted by
 These include data types which are the types given to expressions variable
types of the form  var  and command types of the form  cmd  As one would
expect a variable of type  var stores information whose security class is  or
lower More novelly a command c has type  cmd only if it is guaranteed that
every assignment within c is made to a variable whose security class is  or higher
This is a connement property needed to ensure secure implicit ows We extend
the partial order   to a subtype relation which we denote  The subtype relation





cmd   cmd  As usual there is a type coercion rule that allows a
phrase of type  to be assigned a type 
 
whenever   
 

 Secure Flow Typing Rules
The typing rules guarantee secure explicit and implicit ows as do certication
rules in the lattice model Consider for example the typing rule for assignment




  e  e
 
  cmd
This rule essentially says that in order to ensure that the explicit ow from e
 
to
e is secure e
 
and e must agree on their security levels which is conveyed by 
appearing in both hypotheses of the rule Note however that an upward ow from
e
 
to e is still allowed if e  H var and e
 
 L then with subtyping the type of e
 
can be coerced up to H and the rule applied with   H
 
 
Keep in mind that secrecy and integrity are treated uniformly in our type system
	

 as they are in the lattice model Examples throughout the paper will be
given for secrecy only but they could alternatively be stated for integrity
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Notice that in the preceding typing rule the entire assignment is given type
 cmd  The reason for this is to control implicit ows Here is a simple example
Suppose x is either  or   and consider
if x    then y    else y  
Although there is no explicit ow from x to y there is an implicit ow because x
is indirectly copied to y To ensure that such implicit ows are secure we use the
following typing rule for conditionals
  e   




  if e then c else c
 
  cmd
The intuition behind the rule is that c and c
 
are executed in a context where
information of level  is implicitly known For this reason c and c
 
may only
assign to variables of level  or higher Although the rule requires the guard e and
branches c and c
 
to have the same security level namely   it does not prevent
an implicit upward ow from e to branches c and c
 
 Again subtyping can be used
to establish agreement but unlike the case with assignment statements there are
now two ways to get it The type of e can be coerced to a higher level or the
types of the branches can be coerced to lower levels using the antimonotonicity of
command types In some situations both kinds of coercions are necessary Observe
that no coercions will lead to agreement if there is downward ow from e The
typing rule must reject the conditional in this case
For example suppose x  y  H var  By the preceding typing rule
for assignment we have   y     H cmd and   y    H cmd  This
means that each statement can be placed in a context where high information is
implicitly known through the guard of a conditional statement An example is
if x    then y    else y   With   H the secure ow typing rule for
conditionals gives
  if x    then y    else y    H cmd
So the statement is well typed as is expected knowing that since x and y are high
variables the implicit ow from x to y is secure The resulting type H cmd assures
us that no low variable is updated in either branch no write down This would
permit the entire statement to be used where high information again is implicitly
known Now if x  L var  then the implicit ow is still secure but establishing
this fact within the type system now requires subtyping One option is to use the
antimonotonic subtyping of command types where H cmd  L cmd since L   H
Each branch then is coerced from type H cmd to L cmd so that we can let   L
and get
  if x    then y    else y    L cmd
On the other hand we might coerce the type of x upward from L to H and let
  H instead Then once again the conditional has type H cmd  This would be
our only choice if we had to successfully type the conditional say as the branch
of yet another conditional whose guard is high And nally if x  H var and
y  L var  then the conditional is not well typed which is what we would expect
since now the implicit ow is downward
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if x    then
letvar y    in c
else
letvar y   in c
 
Figure   An implicit ow from x to y
 Local Variable Declarations
Our core language includes a construct for declaring local variables A local vari
able say x in our language is declared as
letvar x  e in c
It creates x initialized with the value of expression e The scope and lifetime of x is
command c The initialization can cause an implicit ow but it is always harmless
Consider for instance the program fragment in Figure   for some commands
c and c
 
 If x is high and each instance of y is low then it might appear as though
the program should be rejected because there is a downward implicit ow from x
to y But if c and c
 
do not update any low variables that is each can be typed
as high commands then the program is actually secure despite the downward
ow The contents of x cannot be laundered via y To see this suppose x is
high Then the rule for typing conditionals given above forces c and c
 
to be typed
as high commands By the connement property then neither c nor c
 
has any
assignments to low variables and thus y cannot be assigned to any low variables
 Type Soundness
We prove two interesting security lemmas for our type system namely Simple
Security and Connement Simple Security applies to expressions and Connement
to commands If an expression e can be given type  in our system then Simple
Security says for secrecy that only variables at level  or lower in e will have
their contents read when e is evaluated no read up For integrity it says that
every variable in e stores information at integrity level   On the other hand if a
command c can be given type  cmd  then Connement says for secrecy that no
variable below level  is updated in c no write down For integrity it states that
every variable assigned to in c can indeed be updated by information at integrity
level  
These two lemmas are used to prove the type system is sound Soundness is
formulated as a kind of noninterference property Intuitively it says that variables
in a welltyped program do not interfere with variables at lower security levels That
is if a variable v has security level   then one can change the initial values of any
variables whose security levels are not dominated by   execute the program and
the nal value of v will be the same provided the program terminates successfully
 Type Inference
It is possible to check automatically whether a program is well typed by using
standard techniques of type inference While a detailed discussion of type inference
is beyond the scope of this paper the basic idea is to use type variables to represent
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unknown types and to collect constraints in the form of type inequalities that the
type variables must satisfy for the program to be well typed In this way one can
construct a principal type for the program that represents all possible types that
the program can be given
 A Formal Treatment of the Type System
We consider a core blockstructured language described below It consists of
phrases which are either expressions e or commands c
phrases p  e j c




j e  e
 
j e  e
 




j if e then c else c
 
j
while e do c j letvar x  e in c
Metavariable x ranges over identiers l over locations addresses and n over
integer literals Integers are the only values We use  for false and   for true and
assume that locations are well ordered
There are no IO primitives in the language All IO is done through free
locations in a program That is if a program needs to read input then it does
so by dereferencing an explicit location in the program Likewise a program that
needs to write output does so by an assignment to an explicit location Locations
may also be created during program execution due to local variable declarations
So a partiallyevaluated program may contain newlygenerated locations as well as
those used for IO
The types of the core language are stratied as follows
data types   s
phrase types    j  var j  cmd
Metavariable s ranges over the set SC of security classes which is assumed to be
partially ordered by   Type  var is the type of a variable and  cmd is the type
of a command
The typing rules for the core language are given in Figure  We omit typing
rules for some of the expressions since they are similar to rule arith Typing
judgments have the form
   p  
where  is a location typing and  is an identier typing  The judgment means that
phrase p has type  assuming  prescribes types for locations in p and  prescribes
types for any free identiers in p An identier typing is a nite function mapping
identiers to  types x is the  type assigned to x by  Also x   is a





other than x A location typing is a nite function mapping locations
to  types The notational conventions for location typings are similar to those for
identier typings
The remaining rules of the type system constitute the subtyping logic and are
given in Figure  Properties of the logic are established by the following lemmas
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int    n  
var    x   var if x   var
varloc    l   var if l  
arith
   e   
   e
 
 




   e   var
   e  
assign
   e   var  
   e
 
 




   c   cmd  
   c
 
  cmd




   e   
   c   cmd  
   c
 
  cmd




   e   
   c   cmd
   while e do c   cmd
letvar
   e   
 x   var   c  
 
cmd
   letvar x  e in c  
 
cmd
Figure  Typing rules for secure information ow
Lemma   Structural Subtyping If    
 
  then either
a  is of the form    
 
is of the form 
 
  and    
 
 
b  is of the form  var and 
 
   or
c  is of the form  cmd   
 
is of the form 
 
cmd   and 
 
   
Proof By induction on the height of the derivation of    
 
 If the derivation
ends with rule base then a is true by the hypothesis of the rule If it ends with
reflex then   
 
 So if  is of the form   then a holds since   is reexive
And if  is of the form  var or  cmd  then b or c hold respectively
Now suppose the derivation ends with rule trans Then there is a 
  
such






by the hypotheses of the rule There are three cases
  If  is of the form   then by induction 
  
is of the form 
  
and    
  
 So by




   
 
reflex    
trans















cmd   cmd
subtype
   p   
   
 
   p  
 
Figure  Subtyping rules
induction again 
 










 If  is of the form  var  then by induction 
  





 and hence 
 
 
 If  is of the form  cmd  then by induction 
  





    So by induction again 
 







  is transitive 
 
   
Finally suppose the derivation ends with cmd

 Then  is of the form
 cmd  
 
is of the form 
 
cmd  and  
 
  by the hypothesis of the rule
By induction 
 
    tu
Lemma   is a partial order
Proof Reexivity and transitivity follow directly from rules reflex and
trans Antisymmetry follows from Lemma   and the antisymmetry of   tu
 The Formal Semantics
The soundness of our type system is established with respect to a natural semantics
for closed phrases in the core language We say that a phrase is closed if it has
no free identiers A closed phrase is evaluated relative to a memory  which is
a nite function from locations to values The contents of a location l  dom
is the value l and we write l  n for the memory that assigns value n to
location l and value l
 
 to a location l
 
 l note that l  n is an update of 
if l  dom and an extension of  otherwise
The evaluation rules are given in Figure  They allow us to derive judgments
of the form   e  n for expressions and   c  
 
for commands These
judgments assert that evaluating closed expression e in memory  results in integer
n and that evaluating closed command c in memory  results in a new memory 
 

Note that expressions cannot cause side eects and commands do not yield values
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base   n n
contents   l  l if l  dom
add









  e n  l  dom
  l  e l  n
sequence













  e      c 
 













  e 
  while e do c 
  e   





 while e do c 
  
  while e do c 
  
bindvar
  e n 
l is the rst location not in dom 
l  n  lxc 
 
  letvar x  e in c 
 
 l
Figure  The evaluation rules
We write exc to denote the captureavoiding substitution of e for all free
occurrences of x in c and let  l be memory  with location l deleted from its do
main Note the use of substitution in rule bindvar which governs the evaluation
of letvar x  e in c A new location l is substituted for all free occurrences of x in
c The result lxc is then evaluated in the extended memory l  n where n is
the value of e By using substitution we avoid having to introduce an environment
mapping x to l One can view lxc as a partiallyevaluated command perhaps
containing other free locations
 Type Soundness
We now establish the soundness of the type system with respect to the semantics
of the core language The soundness theorem states that if l    for some
location l then one can arbitrarily alter the initial value of any location l
 
such




   e   var  
   
 





   e   var  














   e   
   c   cmd  
   c
 












   e   




   while e do c  
 
cmd
Figure 	 Syntaxdirected typing rules
that l
 
 is not a subtype of   execute the program and the nal value of l will
be the same provided the program terminates successfully
To facilitate the soundness proof we introduce a syntaxdirected set of typing
rules The rules of this system are just the rules of Figure  with rules r val
assign if and while replaced by their syntaxdirected counterparts in Fig
ure 	 The subtyping rules in Figure  are not included in the syntaxdirected
system We shall write judgments in the syntaxdirected system as   
s
p  
The benet of the syntaxdirected system is that the last rule used in the deriva
tion of a typing   
s
p   is uniquely determined by the form of p and of  For
example if p is a while loop then the derivation can only end with rule while
 

as opposed to while or subtype in the original system The syntaxdirected
rules also suggest where a type inference algorithm should introduce coercions
Next we establish that the syntaxdirected system is actually equivalent to our
original system First we need another lemma
Lemma   If   
s
p   and    
 





Proof By induction on the height of the derivation of   
s
p  
If the derivation ends with   
s
n   by rule int then by Lemma   
 
is
of the form 
 





If the derivation ends with   
s
e   var either by rule var or varloc
then 
 
  by Lemma  




  by rule arith then   
s
e  




   By Lemma   
 
is of the form 
 




  D  Volpano G  Smith C  Irvine












by rule arith The cases where the
derivation ends with rule compose or letvar are similar
If the derivation ends with   
s
e   by rule r val
 
 then there is a type

  






    By Lemma   
 




















  cmd by rule assign
 
 then
there is a type 
  




































 are handled similarly tu
Equivalence is now expressed by the following theorem
Theorem     p   i   
s
p  
Proof If   
s
p   then it is easy to see that    p   because each use of








 can be simulated
by a use of r val assign if or while followed by a use of subtype
For example a use of assign
 

   e   var  











can be simulated by using assign to show    e  e
 
  cmd  using base
and cmd

 to show   cmd  
 






Now suppose that    p   We will prove that   
s
p   by induction on
the height of the derivation of    p  
If the derivation ends with int var or varloc then   
s
p   is
immediate and it follows directly by induction if the derivation ends with arith
compose or letvar
If the derivation ends with r val assign if or while then   
p   follows by an application of the corresponding syntaxdirected rule using the
fact that   is reexive
Finally suppose the derivation of    p   ends with subtype Then
by the hypotheses of this rule there is a type 
 









 Thus   
s
p   by Lemma 
  tu
From now on we shall assume that all typing derivations are done in the
syntaxdirected type system and therefore shall take  to mean 
s

As nal preparation we establish the following properties of the type system
and semantics
Lemma  Simple Security If   e     then for every l in e  l    
Proof By induction on the structure of e Suppose   l   by rule r val
 

Then there is a type 
 




    Now l  
 
by rule
varloc so l    
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Suppose   e e
 
   Then   e   and   e
 
   By two uses of induction
l     for every l in e and for every l in e
 
 So l    for every l in e e
 
 tu
Simple security applies to both secrecy and integrity In the case of secrecy it
says that only locations at level  or lower will have their contents read when e is
evaluated no read up So if L   H and   L then e can be evaluated without
reading any H locations
In the case of integrity it says that if e has integrity level   then every location
in e stores information at integrity level   For example if T   U  where T is
trusted and U untrusted and   T  then the lemma states that every location in
e stores trusted information
Lemma  Con	nement If    c   cmd   then for every l assigned to in c 
l 	  
Proof By induction on the structure of c Suppose    l  e   cmd by
assign
 
 Then there is a type 
 
such that    l  
 





 By rule varloc l  
 
 so l 	  
The lemma follows directly by induction if c is the composition of two com
mands or a letvar command
Suppose    while e do c
 
  cmd by while
 
 Then there is a type 
 
such that    e  
 




cmd and    
 
 By induction l 	 
 
for every l assigned to in c
 
 So since 	 is transitive l 	  for every l
assigned to in c
 
and hence for every l assigned to in while e do c
 
 The case
when c is a conditional is handled similarly tu
Connement applies to both secrecy and integrity as well In the case of
secrecy it says that no location below level  is updated in c no write down For
integrity it states that every location assigned to in c can indeed be updated by
information at integrity level   So for example if   U  then the lemma says
that no trusted location will be updated when c is evaluated
The following lemma is a straightforward variant of a lemma given in  
Lemma  Substitution If    l   var and  x   var   c  
 
cmd   then
   lxc  
 
cmd 
Lemma  If   c 
 
  then dom  dom
 

Lemma  If   c  
 




The preceding two lemmas can be easily shown by induction on the structure
of the derivation of   c 
 
 Now we are ready to prove the soundness theorem
Theorem  Type Soundness Suppose
a   c   
b   c 
 
 
c 	  c 	
 
 
d dom  dom	  dom  and





l for all l such that l    
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Proof By induction on the structure of the derivation of   c  
 
 Here
we show just three cases update loop and bindvar The remaining
evaluation rules are treated similarly
update Suppose the evaluation under  ends with
  e n 
l  dom
  l  e l  n
and the evaluation under 	 ends with




	  l  e 	l  n
 

and the typing ends with an application of rule assign
 

  l  

var  







  l  e  
 
cmd
There are two cases
  







in e Since   is
transitive l
 
    for every l
 







in e so n  n
 
 Therefore l  nl
 









    
 

    By rule varloc l  

 so l     So by hypothesis e
l  nl
 








    
loop Suppose   while e do c  
 
 	  while e do c  	
 
 and the
typing derivation ends with an application of rule while
 

  e  

 







  while e do c  
 
cmd
Again there are two cases
  

    By the Simple Security Lemma l   

for every l in e Since  
is transitive l    for every l in e Thus by hypothesis e l  	l
for every l in e and hence   e  n and 	  e  n Therefore either the
evaluation under  ends with
  e 
  while e do c 
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and under 	 with
	  e 
	  while e do c 	
or it ends under  with
  e   





 while e do c 

  while e do c 

and under 	 with
	  e   





 while e do c 	

	  while e do c 	

In the rst case l  	l for all l such that l    by hypothesis e so




l for all l such that
l     By Lemma 

 dom  dom
 
 and dom	  dom	
 
 So









l for all l such that l    
 

    By the Connement Lemma l 	 

for every l assigned to in c
Thus for every l assigned to in c l    since otherwise we would have


   since   is transitive So if l  dom and l     then l is not




l  l and 	
 





l for all l such that l    by hypothesis e
bindvar Suppose the evaluation under  ends with
  e n 
l is the rst location not in dom 
l  n  lxc 
 
  letvar x  e in c 
 
 l
and since dom  dom	 the evaluation under 	 ends with
	  e n
 
 
l is the rst location not in dom	 
	l  n
 
  lxc 	
 
	  letvar x  e in c 	
 
 l
and the typing ends with an application of rule letvar
  e  
 
 
 x  
 
var   c  

cmd
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Clearly l  
 
  l  
 
var by varloc By hypothesis d and since l  dom
we have l  dom Thus l  
 
 x  
 
var   c  





  lxc  

cmd  Also doml  n  dom	l  n
 
  doml  
 















     If l
 
 l then it follows by hypothesis e
Otherwise if l
 











in e So if 
 












in e hence n  n
 



























     tu
 Discussion
The early work of Denning 	
 and Andrews and Reitman   treated sound
ness intuitively More recently Mizuno and Schmidt   and rbk   have
attempted to give rigorous soundness proofs for Denningstyle secure ow analy
sis However both of these works take as their starting point an instrumented
semantics in which every value is tagged with a security class at runtime the
security tags are updated at runtime in accordance with Dennings certication
conditions Soundness then amounts to the issue of whether their static ow anal
ysis is consistent with the instrumented semantics But this approach begs the
question of whether the ow analysis embodied in the instrumented semantics is
in fact correct
In contrast we use a completely standard semantics for the language and
the type soundness theorem gives a precise operational characterization of the
signicance of the ow analysis it tells us that altering the initial values of locations





 This approach allows us to adopt typing rules whose correctness is not
intuitively obvious For example our letvar rule allows the program of Figure  
to be typed with x  H and y  L even though there is an implicit ow from x to
y But this is not a problem because our soundness theorem assures us that the
implicit ow is harmless If we had instead used an instrumented semantics then
our letvar rule would essentially be incorporated into the semantics where its
correctness would have to be taken on faith
Ban atre et al  also take a noninterference approach to soundness but they
consider a nondeterministic language They associate with a program variable v
a set called the security variable of v denoted !v Roughly speaking it is the set of
all variables whose values can inuence the value of v either directly or indirectly
They describe an axiomatic information ow logic for deducing whether a variable
is a member of !v for some variable v For example one can deduce that

 
fx  !zg y  z fx  !yg
A soundness proposition Proposition   p 	  is given that basically says that
if x  !y for a given program then executing the program with any two initial
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values of x will produce the same sets of nal values for y as long as the program
may terminate successfully under both initial values However the proposition is
actually false The problem is that their language is nondeterministic and although
there may be an execution path that leads to successful termination other paths
may not terminate So it is possible to get dierent sets of nal values for y For
instance consider the statement
true 
 y   
tu
true 
 x    
 skip y  

The statement is a nondeterministic alternative statement with two guards each of
which is true The body of the second guard is a repetitive statement with just one
guard that being x    If S denotes this statement then one can show using the
ow logic that 
 
fInitg S fx  !yg where Init is dened as x  y
 x  y  x  !y
Yet the set of nal values for y when x   is y    and y   and when x    is
just y    because the loop does not terminate
Denning has used concepts such as uncertainty entropy from information
theory to formalize the notion of information ow in programs  Basically if
a program executed in state s yields a state s
 
 then the execution causes an
information ow from x to y if new information about x in state s is available
from y in state s
 
 In other words we are more certain about the contents of
x knowing y after execution than knowing y before In this setting soundness
seems to require an informationtheoretic characterization It is unclear how such a
characterization could be proved with respect to a standard programming language
semantics Such a semantics does not make explicit notions like uncertainty We
have demonstrated that it is possible to formulate and prove soundness without
resorting to information theory to get a handle on intuitive ideas like information
ow All that one needs to know about what kind of security is guaranteed by our
type system is captured entirely by the type soundness theorem
  Core Language Extensions
The core language we consider has been kept simple perhaps even emasculate to
better explain our basic proof technique Although one can imagine many ways to
extend the language there is an obligation to also extend the type system and to
prove that welltyped programs preserve the security properties of interest Many
interesting research questions arise For instance are there extensions of the type
system to handle other features like concurrency and nondeterminism" If so what
is the proper notion of soundness or in other words what security guarantees can
be made for all welltyped programs"
Some extensions have straightforward typing rules whose soundness can be
shown with only minor changes to the soundness theorem Two examples are
procedures and arrays Adding arrays is fairly easy with variables already in the
language Procedures though require a bit more eort depending on calling
conventions We have extended the core language with procedures in the style of
  D  Volpano G  Smith C  Irvine








where c is a command We limit the number of parameters to three one for each









where acc is a new antimonotonic type constructor that stands for acceptor in
the spirit of Forsythe   An acceptor is a variable that can be assigned to
but not evaluated This is true of out parameters in Ada  but not Ada 	
consequently acc is not antimonotonic in Ada 	 Type  comes from typing













respectively Mode in requires a small change in the type soundness theorem but
the proof methodology is basically the same
Other language features pose more serious problems for our type soundness
theorem One is the idea of explicit type casting within programs Palsberg and
rbk   propose a system for integrity analysis in programs They introduce a
cast operator called trust that can be used to explicitly coerce an untrusted value
to a trusted value Note that the opposite coercion from trusted to untrusted
can always be made implicitly since T   U  While such a coercion seems useful
pragmatically including it in the language rules out our type soundness theorem
It seems quite dicult to characterize what is being guaranteed by the ow analysis
with such a coercion
Another source of diculty is the proper treatment of nondeterminism Ob
serve for instance that if we try to extend the core language with a primitive
random number generator rand  and allow an assignment such as z  rand  
to be well typed when z is low then the soundness theorem no longer holds Ex
ecuting this assignment twice from the same memory may produce dierent nal
values for z A weakness of traditional noninterference is that it is unable to model
security in nondeterministic systems    So perhaps it is not surprising that
nondeterministic language features also cause a problem As mentioned above
Ban atre et al encountered diculty when attempting to prove a form of noninter
ference for nondeterministic programs New security models such as Generalized
Noninterference   should be explored as potential notions of type soundness for
new type systems that deal with nondeterministic programs
 Summary
We have formulated Dennings secure ow analysis as a type system and proved
it sound with respect to a standard programming language semantics for a core
deterministic language The type system cleanly separates the specication of
secure ow analysis from its implementation We expect the core language and
type system to serve as a basis for provablysecure programming languages
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